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over B' (1986: 6) . Following Parsons (1960; see also Giddens 1979), Mann also recognizes collective power: an increase in per capita return due to cooperation. To the extent that collective power refers only to the increase in productivity, separate from the modification of individuals' behaviours itself, then it remains outside my definition. However, the realization of collective power almost always involves power as I have defined it-affecting peoples' behaviours-as a major component. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that colleciive power, although obviously crucial to world history, rarely exists as anything but an unintended product of distributed power or a means to the pursuit of distributed power (seeJones, 1981; Mann 1986 Mann , 1993 McNeill 1982) . This would make distributed power the more central concept. In any event, I restrict my analysis and modification of Mann's scheme to power as I have defined it, thus primarily distributed power.
J. M. Whvitmeyer MANN'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POWER-HOW DOES HE DO IT?
Mann's scheme focuses on a classification of four power sources: military, economic, political, and ideological. He has identified these as an effective way of understanding world history. Thus, he concentrates on these power sources as arganizational realizations of power. His introductory chapter (pp 1-22) in the 1993 volume makes it clear that he considers the four sources to be analytically distinct, although they may be used in conjunction and simultaneously.
Let us review how Mann conceives of these four sources of power. 'Military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized' (1986: 11) . 'Military power is the social organization of physical force' (1993: 8) . ' The essence of Mann's theoretical method, the basis for his classification of the four power sources, is that he conceives of the power sources as ways in which humans and other actors pursue their goals (see, e.g. Mann 1986: 28). This method has two serious, related weaknesses, which tend to be characteristic of empirical research into power at the societal level as well.
The first weakness is that using Mann's method to look at effects at the societal, historical level, we are likely only to notice 'big' apparent actorssuch as armies, bureaucracies, churches, and mass media -as power holders. In effect, the method leads us to classify on the basis of phenomenology rather than analytically, that is, based on process. To a certain extent Mann does base his classification on process. However, he does it inconsistently and incompletely, perhaps because he does not make this analytical basis plain. My method in this article is to improve Mann's analysis by basing the classification of power explicitly on process.
Many classifications of power and much research into societal power share this first weakness. They are phenomenological. That is, they proceed chiefly by considering the obvious holders of power and looking at what they do. Thus the currently dominant approaches to the structure of power in modern stable democracies, the elite, Useem 1984) . These theories and researchers are not wrong. These are indeed powerful actors, and these scholars have done an impressive job of identifying the social structures present and the ways of exerting power.
The flaw here is that these approaches tend to identify the use of power and the actors with disproportionate power before developing the theory. However, what if more is going on than meets the eye? What if the researchers fail to identify all poteniial power holders at the beginning? Then we are left with an incomplete picture of power. This holds us back from an important goal, knowing the relative power of actors in society. We do know a lot about the power of an important group of power holders, how they use their power, and the relative power of the actors within that group. However, we do not know necessarily all the actors who most realize their interests. The above approaches make a serious error when they present their results as if we did.
As a demonstration of this first weakness, consider the recent history of Central Europe. The revoluiions of 1989 do not fit with the preconceptions of the dominant approaches to the structure of power in modern stable democracies described above. Yet, before 1989 the sources of powereconomy, military, media -were far more concentrated in those 'posttotalitarian' societies (Havel 1985) than they are in modern stable democracies. As we shall see, the lessons of the 1989 revolutions also stretch Mann's scheme considerably. Yet others, notably Havel (1985) and Garton Ash (1989) , ideniified the potential before those events. Indeed Havel, long a seemingly powerless, suppressed playwright, was so right that he became head of state of the Czech Republic! This is a striking counterexample to the dominant approaches to power.
The second weakness of Mann's theoretical method is that, while power sources must include ways in which humans and other actors pursue their goals, they are more as well. Social structures and social insiitutions, without necessarily serving their own goals or otherwise being purposive also affect people's behaviours. The dominant approaches to the structure of power in modern stable democracies show dle same weakness. That is, they make the mistake, strange for sociologists, of concentrating on actors as power holders to the neglect of collective productions such as social structures and social institutions. Yet, arguably and at least potentially, such collective prb ductions can exert power too. That is, their effects on people's behaviour are not directly reducible to the goals of power-holding actors. This is suggested by many analyses and studies. For example, Blau ( 1977) analyses how demographic social structure is likely to affect behaviour in a variety of ways. Boudon (1974) shows how certain job allocation processes can constitute a bottleneck in status attainment processes and thus affect people's achievement of status. Moreover, these institutional mechanisms can thwart purposive attempts to affect status achievement by changing an earlier component of the status allocation process, education. Havel (1985) claims that the post-totalitarian system of communist Czechoslovakia controlled not just the common people, but those at every level of the ruling hierarchy. Do we still want to say that such entities -social structures and institutions -have power, in spite of not being purposive? Yes. They are social. They persist and develop through the behaviour of individuals -pursuing goals, I assume (Homans 1967; Whitmeyer 1994) . However, the effects of such collective productions on otherss behaviours may be above and beyond the goals of any of those individuals, or any collective actors (Boudon 1987; Coleman 1990; FIavel 1985; Lindenberg 1985 ; Whitmeyer 1994). Mann recognizes this phenomenon to a certain extent. He conveys some of it by his notion of 'diffused power: 'Diffused poweris not directly commanded.... People are constrained to act ill definite ways, but not by command of any particular person or organization' (1993: 6). However, Mann does not acknowledge the extent to which a variety of collective productions can shape behaviours purposelessly, and that this can happen even in the most authoritarian systems. We can avoid these weaknesses by basing our approach specifically on the process of exerting power. We do so by starting with the power subjects. We ask the question: What are the different ways in which the power subjects' behaviour can be affected? A good model (or models) of the power sul} jects should make it easy to identify such ways and make it difficult to overlook any uses of power or any powerholders. A crucial point is that by basing the analysis of power on human individuals as power subjects we easily can accommodate the possibility that their behaviour is affected by-ieS, that power is possessed and exerted by -entities that are the productions of actors but are not purposive actors in their own right Moreover, we have an ongoing source of improvement for our theory of power Namely, improvements in models of the power subjects should lead to improvements in the analysis of power.l When we consider Mann's scheme we may note that implicitly and at times explicitly (eg, 1993: 7) he does base it on how power subjects are affected Briefly and simply, military power is based on the fact that human individuals' behaviour is affected by purlishers, such as death, physical pain, confinement and the removal of other freedoms, and so forth Economic power is based on the fact that behaviour is affected by rewards -the delivery of goodss services, and money Political power and ideological power present problems, however Again, Mann appears to identify them from the phenomerlology of power, a method that causes confusion Obviously, Mann's political power and ideological power both capture power processes Yet, they do not identify the processes clearly, nor, together with economic and military power, exhaust Clearly, this kind of power encompasses a lleterogeneous set of processes. There are two characteristics of this kind of power that make it somewhat subtle and difficult to investigate. First, these power processes may be carried out without awareness of many of the power subjects. For example, consumers may be unaware of differential governmental tariffs and quotas that nevertheless affect their consumption. Second, it is frequently useful and appropriate to consider that power exists and is being exerted when the power holder does nothing. An obvious case is when laws fail to pass. Here a government is affecting people's behavwour in the sense that it is Mann's th4ory of power making it likely that they will continue to behave as they had been behav-217 ing. Thus, Mann's analysis of political power is partially correct in noting that the central elite do not have tremendous ability to achieve their interests. However, contrary to his analysis, the power of the common people and local actors does not make up the difference. So where is the missing power?
How does this t:ype of power relate to Mann
The 'missing power' is in the middle, in the bureaucratic structure, in the system. It is not serving the interests of any small elite. Rather, it is the unintended and often popularly disliked emergent effect of many individuals using their own small amount of power in part to further their own interests. To elaborate Mann's terminology, it is not authoritative but 'semidiffused' -that is, diffused within the bureaucracy.
Note that this agrees well with what we know of the most extreme examples of the bureaucratic state -those of the Soviet bloc. The command economy (serving the interests of the central elite) did not do well, but neither did the ordinary people flourish (Chirot 1990; Garton Ash 1989 Havel 1985; Remnick 1993) . It also agrees with Havel's (1985) position that the system dominated the Communist Czechoslovakian state. Here, as Mann allows, the governments may be using several sources of power in tandem. However, the phenomenon described above for political power is 218 likely to occur as well with military and economic power. That is, government leaders will not be able to project their will effectively. Still, much of the power will belong to the system and will be exercised over ordinary people, although not purposively. Yet an important question remains as to whether political power, here redefined as the ability to affect indirectly the relationship between behaviours and motivators, in fact may operate in a significantly more tactical and contingent fashion. Arguably, one must be in a certain place at a certain time in order to determine others' institutional, legal, or even exchange environment in such a manner as to affect their behaviour, and only certain individuals or small groups are positioned in that place at that time. Moreover, the effects of this determination are so disproportionate -or difficult to perceive -that those who control this determination have more effect than we would predict from their control over material or military resources, or even their general rank in the political hierarchy. Certainly many accounts of government policy-making suggest that outcomes are not just the moreKr-less inevitable resolution of various competing interests backed by resources of different weights, but that they are often greatly affected by contingent factors. Accounts such as Starr's ( 1982) history of health care in the USA and Kindleberger's (1986) discussion of monetary policy in the 1930s contain many such instances. Political power can have a disproportionate effect also when its influence endures beyond the time horizons of others interested in the outcomes. The extreme case here is political constitutions, which can be affecting the relationship between behaviours and motivators even after many generations! The 'important exception' mentioned above is a market system. Regardless of the degree to which it is affected by the state, a market system itself exerts political power. It controls the opportunities available to buyers and sellers, thus affects their behaviour by affecting the links between behaviour and rewards and punishers. To quibble with Mann, while consumer blocs exert diffuse economic power (rewarding the provision of goods differentially), the market system as a whole exerts diffuse tolitical power (as redefined). This point of similarity between market and bureaucratic systems will not surprise modern students of bureaucracy (see, e.g., Breton and Wintrobe 1982).
Ideological Power
Since our primary theoretical methodology is to deduce ways of affecting people's behaviour from our model of the human actor, let us see what remains after identifying the first three power sources. They stemmed from affecting the link between behaviours and motivators either directly or indirectly. We are left with affecting the set of motivators itself, and affecting the set of considered behaviours itself.
First, then, we can alter people's motivators. This can be a short-term effect, by providing stimuli that temporarily increase the weight of certain Let me begin by noting that Mann's introduction of ideological power (see 1993: 7, as quoted above) -as stemming from 'control' of things people need -conveys economic power, power due to control over valued resources (Coleman 1990 ), which here happen not to be material resources. In chapter two of the 1993 volume, however, he makes it clear that he does not really mean a variant of economic power, when he discusses some of the processes by which ideological power is extended. Key in these processes are literacy, and effects of church, educational institutions, media, and intellectuals. Of course, governments, and in modern times corporations, often stand behind these institutions and individuals.
Clearly church, educational institutions, media, and intellectuals provide information, and influence behaviour thereby. Most indirectly, they tell us about the world around us and tell us what it means, that is, how it relates to our motivators. For example, we find out a political change has occurred in a distant land, and we are told how that affects our national, and presumably thus personal, interests. They tell us what behaviours to perform if we want to get certain rewards and avoid certain punishers. For example, if we want to get to heaven, we must do thus and such; if we want various things out of some government, we must vote for sand-so; we can think of ourselves as good parents, and experience exquisite taste sensations, by consuming such-and-such a breakfast cereal.
In addition, the power holders Mann associates with ideological power are involved in trying to alter motivators both over the short and long terms. One power technique we have deduced is left over. That is, it seems not to fit well under the label of ideological power. This is the technique of affecting long-term behaviour pools, including creating (or failing to create) skills. People, especially children, are taught-or not taughtnumerous skills crucial to their future, from techniques for eking the bare subsistence minimum from the soil to social capital for prospering in the modern white-collar world (see Bourdieu 1991) . On a micro level the power holders, affecting future actions of the teachable, are parents, schoolteachers, and so forth. On a macro level, governments set up literacy and skill-transferral programmes in the hinterlands, create state-wide educational systems, and provide grants and subsidies to those learning certain skills or using (thus maintaining) certain skills. On the other hand, institutions and individuals can actively discourage the learning of certain skills in order to discourage those behaviours. So Mann has left out one type of power. How much of a problem this is depends on the degree to which this power has societal, historical importance. However, a more serious problem remains with ideological power.
This problem is that as with political power, Mann has based his analysis too much on phenomenology and not enough on process, using a model of the power subjects. This leads to a signal deficiency in the identification of key societal actors with ideological power. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of this is provided by the Soviet Union and its Central European satellites in the late 1970s and 1980s, culminating in the events of 1989. The governments of the Soviet Union and its Central European satellites strongly dominated the media, rituals and aesthetics, and intellectuals. However, it was apparent that Central European governments had little
